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REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY PLACED IN THE COURT OP 
APPEALS. 
This Court has jurisdiction because Knowledge Data 
timely filed its appeal within 30 days of the date the final 
agency order was issued. The jurisdictional challenge made by 
the Attorney General fails to properly read the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). Acceptance of the 
Attorney General's strained interpretation of the UAPA would 
offend the rules of statutory construction, defeat one of the 
main objectives of UAPA, waste judicial resources and lead to 
absurd results. 
A. The Request For Reconsideration Was Never Deemed 
Denied Because The Presiding Officer Extended The 
Period In Which The Commission Would Consider The 
Request. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1989)* provides that an 
aggrieved party may file a request for reconsideration within 
20 days of the Utah State Tax Commission's (the 
"Commission's") order and if the Commission does not issue an 
order on reconsideration within 20 days after the filing of 
the request, the request will be considered denied. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) the 
presiding officer may extend the time period in which the 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations to the Utah Code 
Annotated are to the most recent codification as amended. 
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Commission will receive the request for reconsideration and 
the time period in which the Commission will reconsider its 
decisions: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, 
from lengthening or shortening any time period 
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods 
established for judicial review. 
Thus, a request for reconsideration will be considered denied 
within 20 days unless the presiding officer extends the time 
in which the request should be considered. In the present 
matter, the presiding officer, Administrative Law Judge Alan 
L. Hennebold, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9), lengthened 
the time in which Knowledge Data's Request for Reconsideration 
was to be considered. A review of the record and the facts 
contained therein is appropriate. 
On Wednesday, October 28, 1992, the Commission 
entered it Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Final 
Decision. (R. 23). On Monday, November 16, 1992, Knowledge 
Data timely filed its Request for Reconsideration. (R. 20). 
On Wednesday, November 25, 1992 counsel for the Auditing 
Division asked the Commission to extend the time period in 
which it could respond to the Request for Reconsideration. 
2. The language, "except those time periods established for judicial 
review," refers to the 30-day time period set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a): "A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued or considered to have been issued." 
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(R. 18). The Commission granted a continuance. (R. 18).3 
On Tuesday, December 1, 1992, the Division filed its response 
and asked the Commission to leave the review period open until 
at least Friday, December 4, 1992 so it could supplement its 
response. (R. 15). Had the Commission not continued the time 
for considering the Request for Reconsideration, the 20-day 
deemed denied period would have expired on the next working 
day, Monday, December 7, 1993. 
By letter dated Thursday, December 10, 1992, Gary 
Kueltzo, in-house counsel for Knowledge Data, asked Judge 
Hennebold to confirm that the Commission had lengthened the 
deemed denied period pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). 
(R. 13). On Monday, December 14, Judge Hennebold informed Mr. 
Kueltzo by phone that he had lengthened the time period for 
considering the Request for Reconsideration and that he should 
not consider the Request denied. See Affidavit of Judge 
Hennebold in Appendix A (hereinafter referred to as 
"Affidavit"). Judge Hennebold further stated that the 
Commission's decision on reconsideration would be forthcoming 
and that Knowledge Data could file an appeal with the Supreme 
Court within 30 days of that decision if it was dissatisfied. 
3. It is highly disingenuous, at best, for the Attorney General to now 
claim that the Commission could not grant the continuance to extend 
the time in which it would receive and consider the issues on 
reconsideration that the Division and the Attorney General's office 
requested. 
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Aff idav i t at 2, Appendix A, On Friday, January 15, 1993, the 
Commission i ssued i t s order on reconsiderat ion and on Friday, 
February 12, 1993, Knowledge Data t imely f i l e d an appeal of 
that order with the Utah Supreme Court. (R.9, 6 ) . 
As evidenced by the above f a c t s , the Administrative 
Law Judge lengthened the time period in which the Commission 
would consider the Request for Reconsideration. Accordingly, 
the Request was never deemed denied and the j u d i c i a l review 
period of 30 days did not commence u n t i l January 15, 1993. 
The lengthening of the 20-day recons iderat ion period 
i s not novel t o t h i s case , but i s frequently used by the 
Commission, in appropriate circumstances, t o al low i t 
s u f f i c i e n t time t o f u l l y review, correct and c l a r i f y i t s 
d e c i s i o n s / See Af f idav i t at 2 -3 , Appendix A. I f the 
Commission were not allowed t o lengthen the time period in 
which i t considers requests for recons iderat ion , almost every 
4. The case of Dustv's . Inc. v. Auditing Div . . 842, P.2d 868 (Utah 1992) 
c i t e d by the Attorney General i s an example of a case in which the 
Commission lengthened the reconsideration time period beyond 20 
days. In Dustv's . the Commission o r i g i n a l l y issued i t s order on 
January 10, 1992. Requests for reconsideration where f i l e d by the 
taxpayer and the Auditing Div is ion on January 23, 1992 and January 
29, 1992, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Had the Commission not desired to f u l l y 
review the p a r t i e s ' requests , they would have ordinari ly been deemed 
denied on February 12, 1992 and February 18, 1992, r e s pec t ive ly . 
The Commission, however, desired to f u l l y consider the requests and 
thus lengthened the 20-day consideration period u n t i l i t could i ssue 
i t s dec i s ion on reconsiderat ion on March 25, 1992. The March 25th 
order corrected and c l a r i f i e d several points in the or ig ina l January 
10, 1992 order. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that Dusty's 
appeal had not been timely f i l e d because i t was f i l e d more than 30 
days a f ter the March 25, 1992 order had been issued. 
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dec i s ion of the Commission would have to be appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court without the benef i t of the correct ion and 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n that occurs on recons iderat ion. Cler ica l errors 
and omissions that could be e a s i l y corrected by the agency on 
reconsiderat ion would have to be corrected on appeal. The 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals would consequently be 
required t o hear many addit ional and unnecessary appeals . 
The Attorney General's argument, o s t e n s i b l y made on 
behalf of the Commission, i s not only contrary t o the p la in 
language of the s t a t u t e and i t s purpose, but i t i s a l s o 
contrary to the Commission's own long standing p r a c t i c e , and 
should be re jec ted by t h i s Court.5 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(b) the "agency and a l l other 
appropriate part ies" are to be named as respondents in appeals from 
agency ac t ions . Accordingly, the Commission was named as a 
respondent in th i s appeal. As a protect ive measure, the Auditing 
Div is ion of the Commission was a lso named as a respondent so as to 
ident i fy the or ig inat ing d i v i s i o n in which the Commission's act ion 
commenced. I t should be noted that the Auditing Divis ion i s merely 
a d i v i s i o n within the Commission and as such i s not a l ega l e n t i t y 
that has any statutory authority to act on i t s own accord. See Utah 
State Tax Comm'n v. Kats i s . 90 Utah 406, 62 P.2d 120 
(1936)(Commission auditor unauthorized to act independently, the 
Commission i s the only e n t i t y authorized to act q u a s i - j u d i c i a l l y ) . 
When the Appellees' Brief was f i l e d by the Attorney General's Office 
on June 15, 1993, i t only i d e n t i f i e d the Brief as being f i l e d in the 
name of the Auditing Divis ion. I t i s assumed that the Appellees' 
Brief and the arguments therein are f i l e d on behalf of the 
Commission, although, as noted, they re jec t the Commission's wel l 
e s tab l i shed prac t i ce . I f the Attorney General does not represent 
the Commission in t h i s appeal, however, the Brief should be s tr icken 
as being submitted by an e n t i t y that does not have standing before 
the Court. 
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B. Even I f The Request For R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n Had Been 
Deemed Denied P r i o r To The Commission's Order, 
The P l a i n Reading Of Utah Code Ann. § 6 3 - 4 6 b -
1 4 ( 3 ) ( a ) Al lows The P i l i n g Of An Appeal Within 30 
Days o f The Commission 7s Order. 
UAPA provides t h a t an appeal from a f ina l agency 
act ion may be i n i t i a t e d "within 30 days a f t e r the date t h a t 
the order cons t i t u t ing the f ina l agency act ion i s issued or i s 
considered to have been i ssued ." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a). Accordingly, an aggrieved par ty may f i l e 
i t s appeal e i t h e r within 30 days of the date of the order or 
within 3 0 days of the date t h a t the request i s deemed to be 
denied. The language of t h i s s t a t u t e i s c l ea r and unambiguous 
and should be in te rpre ted according to i t s p la in meaning.6 
The Commission's order on reconsiderat ion was issued on 
January 15, 1993 and Knowledge Data f i l ed i t s appeal with the 
Supreme Court on February 12, 1993. Inasmuch as Knowledge 
Data complied with the p la in language of the s t a t u t e and f i l ed 
i t s appeal within 30 days of the date the order was issued, 
t h i s Court c l ea r ly has j u r i s d i c t i o n . 7 
6. But ter f i e ld Lumber. Inc. v. Peterson Mortg. Corp.. 815 P.2d 1330, 
1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(where the language of the s ta tu te i s 
unambiguous "we construe the s ta tu te according to i t s p la in 
meaning"). 
7. Even i f Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) were ambiguous, the general ly 
applied rule i s that the s ta tute should be interpreted with a 
"presumption" "in favor of re tent ion rather than d i v e s t i t u r e of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . " Daou v. Harris. 139 Ariz. 353, 678 P.2d 934 (1984). 
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The Attorney General refuses to read Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) as i t i s written, as an "either-or" option. 
Rather, the Attorney General asks the Court to add to the 
language of the statute by requiring an appeal to be f i l ed 
within 30 days of the date that the order i s issued or 
considered to have been issued, "whichever date i s earl ier." 
Had the legis lature intended th i s result they would have added 
the language to the statute when they enacted i t . 8 To request 
th i s Court to act l eg i s la t ive ly to add th i s language v io lates 
the rules of statutory construction previously identif ied and 
the separation of powers between the Court and the 
Legislature.9 
Other jurisdict ions , in reviewing similar 
administrative appeal provisions, have refused to 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y add the "whichever date i s earlier" language and 
have allowed appeals f i led within the prescribed time period 
8. See West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982)("We must 
assume that each term in the s ta tute was used advisedly by the 
Legis lature and that each should be interpreted and applied 
according to i t s usual ly accepted meaning. Where the ordinary 
meaning of the terms r e s u l t s in an appl icat ion that i s nei ther 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradict ion to 
the express purpose of the s t a t u t e , i t i s not the duty of t h i s Court 
to assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme."). 
9. See Bevans v. Industr ial Comm'n. 790 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)(the Court w i l l not l e g i s l a t e by reading a provis ion into a 
s t a t u t e ) ; see a l so Kerans v. Industrial Comm'n. 713 P.2d 49, 55 
(Utah 1986)("Following wel l -recognized rules of s tatutory 
construct ion, we . . . decl ine to read into the s ta tute a provis ion 
not apparently intended by i t s enactment.") 
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from the date of the order on recons iderat ion , even though the 
order was i ssued a f t e r the request for recons iderat ion could 
have been deemed denied. See Vorm v. David Douglas School 
D i s t r i c t , 45 Or. App. 225, 608 P.2d 193 (1980). In Vorm, an 
adminis trat ive agency affirmed the school d i s t r i c t ' s 
termination of an employee and the employee t imely f i l e d a 
p e t i t i o n for recons iderat ion . Pursuant t o Ore. Rev. S t a t . 
§ 183.482 (1) ,10 the p e t i t i o n was deemed denied 60 days a f t e r 
i t was f i l e d . Subsequent t o the deemed denied date , the 
agency i ssued i t s order on reconsiderat ion and the employee 
t imely f i l e d i t s appeal within 60 days from the date of the 
actual order. The Court of Appeals re jec ted the school 
d i s t r i c t ' s claim that the appeal was not t imely because i t was 
not f i l e d within 60 days of the deemed denied date . See a l s o 
Mayer v . Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 366 A.2d 
605 (Penn. 1976)(claimant had 30 days from the date of the 
board's actual order on reconsiderat ion t o f i l e an appeal even 
though the motion for reconsiderat ion may have been deemed 
denied much e a r l i e r ) ; and Waldron v . Wilson, 505 N.E. 2d 858 
10. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 183.482(1) provides in pertinent part: "Proceeding 
for review shall be instituted by f i l ing a petit ion in the Court of 
Appeals. The petit ion shall be f i led within 60 days only following 
the date the order upon which the petit ion i s based i s served 
unless otherwise provided by statute. If the agency does not 
otherwise act, a petit ion for rehearing or reconsideration shall be 
deemed denied the 60th day following the date the petit ion was 
f i led , and in such cases, petit ion for judicial review shall be 
f i led within 60 days only following such date." 
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(Ind, Ct. App. 1987)(although Waldron's motion for 
reconsiderat ion was deemed denied five days a f t e r f i l i n g , the 
t r i a l court was authorized to ru le on the motion 130 days 
l a t e r and t h i s l a t e r date s t a r t ed the time for appeal because 
i t was the c e r t i f i e d f ina l o rder ) . 
In e f fec t , a p e t i t i o n for reconsiderat ion i s s imi lar 
to a post-judgment motion tha t t o l l s the time in which an 
appeal must be f i l ed with the cour t . See Gallardo v. 
Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990)(f i l ing of pos t -
judgment motion t o l l s the time for appeal) .1 1 This t o l l i n g 
allows the t r i a l court or agency to correc t or c l a r i fy items 
in t h e i r decis ions before the aggrieved party must f i l e an 
appeal, thus preserving j u d i c i a l resources . The Commission 
has long recognized the benefi t of being able to reconsider 
i t s decisions before the taxpayer i s require t o f i l e an 
appeal. Accordingly, the Commission has in te rpre ted Utah Code 
11. The Attorney General's c i t a t i o n s to Hase v. Hase. 775 P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Vanjonora 
v. Draper. 30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 1320 (1974); Denlev v. 
Shearson/American Exp.. I n c . . 733 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1984); Smith v. 
Evans. 853 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1988); and Martinez v. Trainer. 556 
F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977) are completely inapposite to t h i s appeal. 
Each of these cases held that the l a t e f i l i n g of a post-judgment 
motion did not t o l l the time period for f i l i n g an appeal. In t h i s 
appeal, i t i s uncontested that the Request for Reconsideration was 
timely f i l e d within 20 days of the October 28, 1992 Order. Moreover, 
the Attorney General concedes that a request for reconsideration 
t o l l s the time in which the appeal needs to be f i l e d . The only 
contested i ssue i s how long does the t o l l period l a s t -- u n t i l the 
Commission enters i t s order or u n t i l the deemed denied period runs? 
As previously answered in the above d iscuss ion , the t o l l period runs 
u n t i l the Commission enters i t s order. 
- 9 -
Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) as allowing the aggrieved party 30 days 
from the date of the order on reconsideration to file an 
appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. See January 15, 1993 
Order on Reconsideration. (R. 11) (final page of the 
Commissions order gave notice to the Knowledge Data that it 
had 30 days from the date of the order to file an appeal with 
the Supreme Court); see also. Affidavit at 3, Appendix A (when 
taxpayers ask, they are told they can file an appeal within 3 0 
days of the date of the order on reconsideration). 
C. The Attorney General/s Interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) Violates Principles 
of Judicial Economy and Yields Absurd Results. 
The Attorney General's Office suggests that the 
deemed denied period for reconsideration cannot be lengthened 
because it fears that its client, the Commission, could 
indefinitely delay ruling on requests for reconsideration. 
This fear is speculative, misperceived12 and greatly 
overshadowed by the benefit of allowing agencies, on 
reconsideration, to clarify issues for appeal and reduce the 
cases that appellate courts must review. If the Attorney 
General's suggestion is accepted, this appeal and many other 
pending appeals before this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
will be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. If, on the 
12. It should be noted that the reconsideration period is not lengthened in 
every case, but only in those that the Commission believes should be 
more fully reviewed for good cause. In the cases cited in this Reply 
Brief the average time extension was 37 days. 
-10-
other hand, the Attorney General's suggestion is rejected, the 
Commission and the other administrative agencies in this state 
will continue to be able to review and correct their decisions 
and obviate the filing of unnecessary appeals with this and 
the Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, should an agency delay its decision 
unduly, or refuse to rule at all, the deemed denial date could 
be relied on by an aggrieved petitioner. In other words, the 
deemed denied date is an ameliorative provision that enables a 
petitioner to exhaust its administrative remedies and obtain 
judicial review in situations where an agency prefers to take 
no action on a request for reconsideration. Where the agency 
chooses to act, however, and so notifies the petitioner, it 
should be allowed to do so. 
II. BOTH THE ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES AND THE TRADED 
PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS EXEMPT THE SUBJECT HARDWARE 
ACQUISITIONS FROM SALES AND USE TAX; AND IT DOES NOT 
MATTER WHETHER THE HARDWARE WAS ACQUIRED IN EXCHANGE 
FOR PROPERTY, CASH/ CREDIT OR OTHER CONSIDERATION, 
The Attorney General spends extensive time in its 
brief arguing that Knowledge Data is the ultimate consumer of 
the used computer hardware it acquired from the University of 
Minnesota (the "University") and ICI Americas ("ICI"). 
Appellees' Brief at 20-28. Knowledge Data agrees that it is 
the ultimate consumer of the hardware/3 just as L.A. Young 
13. The fact that Knowledge Data is the ultimate consumer of the hardware 
was stipulated to in the Parties' Stipulation of facts. (R. 41). 
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Sons Construction Company was the ultimate consumer of the 
construction equipment it acquired from Amis Construction Co. 
in Wyoming and just as Husky Oil Company was the ultimate 
consumer of the refinery reformer it acquired in Canada from 
Gulf Oil Canada, Ltd. 
As the ultimate consumers, Knowledge Data, L.A. Young 
Sons Construction Company and Husky Oil Company would have 
been required to pay sales or use tax on the hardware but for 
the intervention of the isolated and occasional sales tax 
exemption. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14); L.A. Young 
Sons Const. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 457 P.2d 973 (Utah 1969); 
and Husky Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 
1976). As fully discussed in Appellant's Brief at pages 8 
through 13 the isolated and occasional sales exemption exempts 
the subject transactions and the Commission was in error to 
try to impose use tax on the transactions. If the use tax can 
be imposed, this sales tax exemption would be rendered totally 
meaningless, inasmuch as the user is responsible ultimately 
for both the sales and use tax. 
The Attorney General's sole rebuttal to the 
application of the isolated and occasional sales exemption is 
the unsupported argument that the exemption does not apply to 
the two subject transactions because the used hardware was 
acquired by trade-in. Not only is this argument incorrect 
legally, it is incorrect factually with regard to the ICI 
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t ransac t ion . The ICI hardware was not acquired in a t r a d e - i n . 
As s e t forth in the S t ipu la t ion of f a c t s , Knowledge Date 
"purchased used computer hardware from ICI." (R. 41 emphasis 
added). The cash purchase pr ice for the hardware was 
"$50,000" at a "d i s t re s s s a l e . " (R. 69) . 
The used hardware acquired from the Univers i ty was 
obtained in exchange for other property. The form of 
cons iderat ion exchanged in a transact ion , however, does not 
a f f e c t whether the transact ion i s a "sale" subject to tax or a 
"sale" e n t i t l e d to protect ion by the i s o l a t e d and occasional 
s a l e s exemption. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) def ines s a l e 
t o mean "any transfer of t i t l e , exchange, or barter , 
condi t ional or otherwise, in any manner of tang ib le personal 
property . . . for a consideration." 1 4 Accordingly, the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of the used computer hardware would be subject to 
tax unless an exemption ac t s to preclude the imposit ion of the 
tax . 
14. Apparently, even the Commission disagrees with the Attorney General's 
argument that the form of consideration i s d i s p o s i t i v e . In i t s 
October 28, 1992 order, the Commission incorrect ly assumed that the 
ICI hardware was acquired by trade. (R. 25) . In i t s Request for 
Reconsideration, Knowledge Data pointed out t h i s factual error and 
c i t e d the Commission to the Part ies ' St ipulat ion that c l ear ly 
i d e n t i f i e d that Knowledge Data had purchased the ICI hardware. (R. 
21) . In i t s order on reconsideration, the Commission s tated that 
t h i s factual error was not "material" to i t s dec i s ion and did not 
a f f e c t whether the i s o l a t e d and occasional sa l e s exemption applied. 
(R. 10) . 
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There are two exemptions that preclude the imposit ion 
of tax in the the Univers i ty a c q u i s i t i o n : the i s o l a t e d and 
occas ional s a l e s exemption (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14)) 
and the traded property exemption (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(19) ) . As f u l l y d iscussed in Appel lant 's Brief at pages 8-
13 the Univers i ty and ICI transact ions qual i fy for the 
i s o l a t e d and occasional s a l e s exemption because Knowledge Data 
acquired hardware from e n t i t i e s that are not regular ly engaged 
in the bus iness of s e l l i n g hardware.15 
Even i f the i s o l a t e d and occas ional s a l e s exemption 
were not appl icable to the subject t ransac t ions , the traded 
property exemption ("Exemption 19") would exempt the 
Univers i ty transact ion from tax . Exemption 19 proscr ibes the 
imposit ion of tax on property that i s acquired by exchange. 
"An even exchange of tang ib le personal property for tang ib l e 
personal property i s exempt from t a x . " Utah Admin. R. R865-
19-72S (1992-1993). Tax only appl ies t o the "consideration in 
money which change[s] hands" when there i s an uneven exchange 
15. The Attorney General's c i t a t i o n to cases such as Merri l l Bean 
Chevrolet. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 549 P.2d 443 (Utah 1976); Law 
Lincoln Mercury. Inc. v . Strickland. 271 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 1980); and 
City of Philadelphia v. Heinel Motors. 142 Pa. Super. 493, 16 A.2d 
761 (1940) are completely inapposite because these cases concern 
reg i s t ered motor v e h i c l e s . Utah has expressly excluded reg i s tered 
motor v e h i c l e s from rece iv ing the benef i t s of the i s o l a t e d and 
occasional s a l e s exemption. 
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of property. Id.1 6 The Attorney General severe ly misreads 
Exemption 19 and Rule 72S in i t s Brief when i t assumes that 
tax can be imposed on the subsequent use of property that i s 
acquired by t r a d e - i n . Nowhere does Exemption 19 or Rule 72S 
apply a tax on the use of property acquired by trade. The 
e n t i t y acquiring the exchanged property w i l l e i t h e r consume 
the property acquired or r e s e l l i t t o another. I f the party 
consumes the property, no tax i s applied because no money 
changes hands.17 If , however, the e n t i t y r e s e l l s the 
property, tax can be imposed on the money c o l l e c t e d at that 
time because a separate transact ion has occurred and a 
monetary value has been placed on the property by the market. 
Utah Admin. R. R865-19-72S (1992-1993) ("Subsequently, when 
the used car i s so ld , tax appl ies to the s e l l i n g pr ice l e s s 
any t rade - in at that t i m e . " ) . 
The Attorney General's c i t a t i o n of Tummurru Trades, 
Inc. v . Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990) for 
16. Prior to the enactment of Exemption 19, Utah's Tax Code required that 
the Commission determine the value of property exchanged and assess 
tax on the dif ference of the values of the property exchanged. 
Vrontikis Bro. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.. 9 Utah 2d 60, 337 
P.2d 434 (1959). Because i t was extremely time consuming and 
imprecise to s e t f a i r market values on exchanged property, Exemption 
19 was enacted to exempt the tax on the exchange of property and to 
only impose the tax on the "consideration in money which changed 
hands." The exemption and the po l icy apply equally to both the 
sa l e s and use taxes . 
17. I f the Attorney General were correct in i t s assumption that the 
subsequent use of property acquired by trade could be taxed, 
Exemption 19 would be rendered completely meaningless. 
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the propos i t ion that the use of property acquired by trade i s 
subject t o tax i s misplaced. In Tummurru, the contractor did 
not pay s a l e s tax on the purchase of bui ld ing mater ia l s 
because he claimed that he was acquiring the mater ia l s for 
r e s a l e t o h i s customers who were the u l t imate consumers. 
Tummurru did not acquire the bui ld ing mater ia l s by trade and 
Exemption 19 was not appl i cab le . When Tummurru did not s e l l 
the mater ia l s at r e t a i l , but rather consumed the mater ia l s 
himself , Tummurru had t o pay the tax because the wholesale 
exemption had been improperly claimed. The tax applied when 
Tummurru took the mater ia ls out of inventory because that was 
when i t became apparent that Tummurru was the u l t imate 
consumer and the wholesale exemption would not be appl icable 
as o r i g i n a l l y claimed. Tummurru i s not appl icable t o the case 
at bar because i t did not deal with the i s o l a t e d and 
occas ional s a l e s exemption or traded property exemption both 
of which are c l e a r l y appl icable t o t h i s t ransac t ion . Unlike 
Tummurru, the f a c t s on which the exemptions were o r i g i n a l l y 
j u s t i f i e d in t h i s case have not changed and Knowledge Data's 
use of the hardware has remained f u l l y c o n s i s t e n t with the use 
contemplated under each exemption.18 
18. Whether the used computer hardware was placed in a f ixed as se t account 
or an inventory account i s not d i s p o s i t i v e in an Exemption 19 
s i t u a t i o n . What i s d i s p o s i t i v e i s whether the used hardware i s 
u l t imate ly reso ld . I f the hardware i s never reso ld , no tax app l i e s . 
Even though the booking of the hardware into the f ixed as se t account 
i s not d i s p o s i t i v e in t h i s case , Knowledge Data i s amazed that the 
Attorney General can s t i p u l a t e that Knowledge Data acquired the used 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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I I I . KNOWLEDGE DATA HAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 
U .S .C . § 1983 AND IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' PEES 
UNDER 42 U .S .C . § 1988. 
A. Utah Recogn izes § 1983 and § 1988 Cla ims . 
This Court has already recognized t h a t § 1983 claims 
are cognizable in Utah's s t a t e courts and has awarded 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees under § 1988. See Prince v. Tooele County 
Housing Authority. 834 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and 
Lorenc v. Cal l . 789 P.2d 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(both awarding 
a t t o rneys ' fees awarded under § 1988). 
Contrary to the Attorney General 's a l l ega t ion , the 
cases of Nuthrown v. Munn. 311 Or. 328, 811 P.2d 131 (1991), 
c e r t , denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992) and Hoaan v. 
Muslof, 471 N.W. 2d 216 (Wis. 1992), c e r t , denied. U.S. 
, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992) do not stand for the proposi t ion 
t h a t § 1983 and § 1988 claims r e l a t i ng to s t a t e tax matters 
cannot be brought in s t a t e cour t . Rather, these cases c l ea r ly 
hold t h a t such claims can be brought in s t a t e court , but only 
a f t e r adminis t ra t ive remedies have been exhausted. Generally, 
a par ty need not exhaust i t s adminis t ra t ive remedies p r io r to 
bringing § 1983 and § 1988 claims. See Felder v. Casey, 487 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
hardware by trade and that such property "was booked to a f ixed 
as se t account and was not held for subsequent sa le in an inventory 
account," and then, when these s t ipu la ted fac t s are not conducive to 
i t s argument, a l l ege that the booking of the hardware to the asse t 
account i s a f i c t i o n because a l l traded property must 
"automatically" go into an inventory account. See (R. 48) and 
Appel lees' Brief at 27. 
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U.S. 131 (1988). Nevertheless, because of the Tax Injunction 
Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341), when the claims relate to state tax 
matters, the taxpayer must pursue administrative relief prior 
to filing the § 1983 and § 1988 claims. 
Nutbrown and Hoaan dealt with the issue of whether a 
state must refund state income taxes that were alleged to have 
been improperly collected from federal retirees. In both 
Nutbrown and Hoaan, the taxpayers filed § 1983 and § 1988 
claims in the state trial courts without first seeking 
administrative relief by filing refund claims with the state 
Departments of Revenue. In both cases, the courts held that 
the § 1983 and § 1988 claims could be brought in state court, 
but only after the administrative remedies were pursued: 
[W]e conclude that plaintiffs who challenge 
the administration of state's taxing 
statutes must exhaust their administrative 
remedies before commencing their sec. 1983 
claims in the courts of this state. 
Hoaan. 471 N.W. 2d at 225 and 226. 
In the present case, Knowledge Data complied with the 
holdings in Nutbrown and Hoaan and first sought administrative 
relief at the Commission. Because Knowledge Data was denied 
relief administratively it sought judicial relief with this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and properly 
commenced its § 1983 and § 1988 claims.19 
19. The pay and sue-for-refund remedy urged by the Attorney General on 
pages 35 and 36 of its Brief is the very remedy Nutbrown and Hogan 
determined cannot be pursued without first exhausting administrative 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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B. The Issues Underlying the § 1983 and § 1988 
Claims Were Raised At The Commission. 
As evidenced in the Nutbrovn and Hoaan decisions, 
§ 1983 and § 1988 attorneys fees cannot be demanded before the 
administrative agency because the agency may grant relief on 
the underlying claims and thus prevent the attorney's fee 
claims from ever maturing. Such claims do not become ripe 
unless and until the administrative agencies fail to provide 
the taxpayer the requested relief. When judicial relief is 
required, however, the § 1983 and § 1988 claims may be 
alleged. 
Although it is premature to allege violations of 
§ 1983 and § 1988 before the Commission, the constitutional 
issue which gives rise to these claims may be, and was, 
alleged at the Commission. Knowledge Data originally believed 
that the Auditing Division had erred in its deficiency 
assessment merely by failing to consider the isolated and 
occasional sales exemption. When the Commission issued its 
October 26, 1992 Order, however, it became apparent that the 
Commission denied the exemption because the sales took place 
outside of Utah. (R.26). Such a ruling clearly discriminates 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
remedies. See also Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax 
Comm'n. 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957)(here the taxpayer pursued 
the course urged by the Attorney General and had his action 
dismissed when the court ruled that he had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies). 
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against interstate commerce and violates the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution. In its Request for 
Reconsideration, Knowledge Data clearly and expressly raised 
this issue of discrimination. See (R. 22) and the cases cited 
by Knowledge Data in its Request for Reconsideration: Barrett 
Investment Com, v. State Tax Comitt'n, 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 
998 (1964)(disparate tax treatment of goods purchased inside 
and outside Utah would violate interstate commerce); and Kraft 
General Foods, Inc. V. Iowa Dep't of Rev., U.S. , 112 
S. Ct. 2 365 (1992)(disparate tax treatment of domestic and 
foreign companies violates the Commerce Clause). 
When the Commission issued its January 15, 1993 Order 
on reconsideration, it rejected Knowledge Data,s argument that 
the Commission's conduct unconstitutionally burdened 
interstate commerce. Upon the rejection of the interstate 
commerce argument at the administrative level, the Civil 
Rights7 actions became ripe and could properly be alleged, 
. • • • t 2 0 
with the Commerce Clause violation, in this Court. 
20. Note, that even if § 1983 and § 1988 are not specifically cited, an 
underlying violation of the Commerce Clause entitles Knowledge Data 
to relief and attorneys' fees under § 1983 and § 1988. 
Bloominedale's Bv Mail LTD v. Huddleston. 848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 
1992), cert, denied. U.S. , 125 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993)(quoting 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. 
of the Citv of Grand Rapids. 835 F.2d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 1987) ("The 
mere failure to plead or argue reliance on § 1983 is not fatal to a 
claim for attorneys' fees if the pleading and evidence do present a 
. . . claim for which § 1983 provides a remedy."). 
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C. The Commission's Imposition Of The Use Tax 
Discriminates Against Interstate Commerce And 
Violates The Commerce Clause. 
The Attorney General concedes that the Commerce 
Clause would be violated, if the property were acquired by 
purchase instead of by trade. Appellees/ Brief at 37. (Thus, 
the Attorney General must also concede that the tax was 
improperly imposed on the ICI transaction. See pp. 12 to 13, 
above). As previously discussed above, pp. 11 to 14, however, 
the fact that the hardware was acquired by trade does not 
obviate the application of the isolated and occasional sales 
exemption. Consequently, Knowledge Data's argument that the 
Commission violated the Commerce Clause by not applying the 
isolated and occasional sales exemption, Appellant's Brief at 
13 to 16, remains unrebutted. 
On appeal, the Attorney General claims that the 
Commission did not impose tax on the initial sale because it 
was exempt under Exemption 19 as traded property. The 
Attorney General further argues that the Commission could tax 
the subsequent use of any property acquired by trade, whether 
the property was acquired inside or outside Utah without 
violating the Commerce Clause. This characterization of the 
Commission's Decisions is inaccurate. The Commission did not 
consider Exemption 19 as the reason why the acquisition of the 
hardware was exempt from sales tax. The Commission expressly 
determined that the acquisition was exempt "because the sales 
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took place outside Utah." (R. 26). Having made this 
conclusion, the Commission then reviewed whether the isolated 
and occasional sales exemption applied. The Commission 
refused to apply the exemption solely because the property was 
acquired outside Utah and was subsequently used "in Utah." (R. 
10). As discussed in Appellant's Brief at 13-16, this 
conclusion violates the Commerce Clause and is contrary to 
Utah's well established precedent applying the isolated and 
occasional sales exemption. Even if the Commission had relied 
on the traded property exemption, the transaction must still 
be exempt. Like the occasional sales exemption, the traded 
property exemption would be a nullity if it did not apply to 
both the sales and use tax. (See pp. 14-15, above). 
D. Knowledge Data Is Entitled To Attorneys7 Fees 
Under § 1988 Even If The Court Resolves The 
Issues Under A Non-civil Rights Claim. 
To obtain relief under § 1983 a party "need allege 
only (1) that some person deprived complainant of a right, 
privilege or immunity secured by the federal constitution; and 
(2) that such person acted under color of state law." Lorenc 
v. Call. 789 P.2d at 50 (citations omitted). Knowledge Data 
has satisfied these requirements: (1) it has alleged that the 
Commission has deprived it of its constitutional right to 
engage in interstate commerce without state interference 
(Dennis v. Higglns, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) (Nebraska's imposition 
of certain motor vehicle taxes violated the Commerce Clause 
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and was thus actionable under § 1983)), and (2) it has alleged 
that the Commission acted under color of the sales and use tax 
act and its administrative rules to deprive these rights by 
imposing use tax on its out-of-state property acquisitions 
(Bloomingdale's By Mail, Ltd, v. Huddleston, 848 S.W.2d 52 
(Tenn. 1992), cert, denied, U.S. , 125 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1993) (state action of imposing use tax under color of its 
tax statute violated the Commerce Clause and was actionable 
under § 1983)). 
Even if the Court determines that Knowledge Data is 
entitled to relief under one of its statutory or non-civil 
rights claims, it is still entitled to attorneys' fees under 
§ 1988: 
[A] plaintiff is generally entitled to an 
award of attorney fees under section 1988 if 
the plaintiff prevails on a statutory, non-
civil-rights claim which is pendent to a 
substantial constitutional claim and which 
arises from a 'common nucleus of operative 
fact.7 
Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d at 50 (quoting. Smith v. 
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); see Prince v. Tooele County 
Housing Authority, 834 P.2d at 604. 
In Prince, this court never reached the § 1983 claim 
because it determined that the Housing Authority had violated 
state statutes in improperly terminated the claimants housing 
eligibility. Because Prince's § 1983 claims arose from the 
same common nucleus of fact, however, this Court concluded 
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that attorneys' fees should be awarded to Prince under § 1988. 
Granting such fees "furthers the Congressional goal of 
encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without 
undermining the longstanding judicial policy of avoiding 
unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues," 
Prince, 834 P.2d at 604 (citations omitted). 
Knowledge Data's statutory claims, Commerce Clause 
claim and § 1983 claim all arise out of the same common 
nucleus of fact surrounding the out-of-state acquisition of 
the used computer hardware from the University and ICI. If 
this Court determines that tax was improperly imposed for any 
of these reasons, Knowledge Data should still be awarded 
attorneys' fees under § 1988 in accordance with rationale 
announced in Prince and Lorenc. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument, Knowledge Data 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Commission's 
Orders of October 28, 1992 and January 15, 1993, and declare 
that Knowledge Data's use of computer hardware it purchased in 
isolated or occasional sales from the University and ICI is 
exempt from sales and use tax. Knowledge Data further 
requests that the Court rule that the Commission's imposition 
of use tax on property purchased in an out-of-state isolated 
or occasional sale violates the Commerce Clause and the 
Federal Civil Rights Act, and award Knowledge Data its 
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reasonable attorneys' fees associated with this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of August, 1993 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLC 
R. Brufce Jotyhsqn, 
David J. Crapo 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT APPEALS 
KNOWLEDGE DATA SYSTEMS, ] 
Petitioner/Appellant, ; 
vs. ; 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, j 
AND AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ] 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, ] 
Respondents/Appellees. ] 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
> ALAN L. HENNEBOLD 
i Case No. 930323 
i Priority 15 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ALAN L. HENNEBOLD, having been duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an Administrative Law Judge with the Utah 
State Tax Commission. 
2. I was the Administrative Law Judge who was 
assigned to hear the above captioned matter when it was 
pending before the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Knowledge 
Data Appeal"). 
3. On October 28, 1992, the Tax Commission issued 
its Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision 
("Final Decision") in the Knowledge Data Appeal. 
4. On November 16, 1992, Knowledge Data filed a 
Request for Reconsideration of the Final Decision with the Tax 
Commission. 
5. By letter dated December 10, 1992, Knowledge 
Data's in-house counsel, Gary Kueltzo, asked the Tax 
Commission if it intended to respond to the Request for 
Reconsideration of the Final Decision or if he should file an 
appeal within thirty days after the deemed denied period of 
twenty days. A copy of Mr. Kueltzo's December 10, 1992 letter 
is attached hereto. 
6. On or about December 14, 1992, Mr. Kueltzo 
called me to discuss his December 10, 1992 letter. I informed 
Mr. Kueltzo that the Tax Commission intended to rule on his 
Request for Reconsideration of the Final Decision. I further 
informed Mr. Kueltzo that because many requests and petitions 
are filed with the Tax Commission, it is rare that the Tax 
Commission can schedule a meeting of the Commissioners to rule 
on all the requests for reconsideration within the twenty-day 
period. I informed Mr. Kueltzo to wait for the Tax Commission 
to issue its decision on his Request for Reconsideration and 
that if he was displeased with the decision on 
reconsideration, he could appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
within thirty days of the date the decision on reconsideration 
was issued. 
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7. Due to the large volume of cases and requests 
for reconsideration, the majority of the requests for 
reconsideration filed with the Tax Commission are not acted 
upon within twenty days. The information communicated to Mr. 
Kueltzo to wait for the decision on reconsideration to be 
issued is routinely given to those individuals who contact the 
Tax Commission concerning the status of their requests for 
reconsideration. 
DATED this /^i^day of July, 1993. 
AV-H^OK 
Alan L. Hennebold 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this )A^ day of 
July, 1993. 
NOTARY PU3LSC. 






AMERICAN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES 
GARY S. KUELTZO, ESQ.
 3 0 S o u t h wacker Drive. Suite 3600 
Manager-State and Local Taxes Chicago, Illinois 60606 
312/750-5320 
December 10, 1992 
Allan Hennebold ^ < 
Utah State Tax Commission S ^ ^ A * ** ^ JQq^ ^jf/j! 
160 East Third South A+£ >*is ^ d *& I ou nasi i mra aouin ^ TA ^ &c* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 0OfyT'0/i> 
Re: KDS 
Appeal Number 91-0934 
Dear Mr. Hennebold: 
I received a call from the Attorney General's office asking for additional time to respond to 
petitioners request for redetermination and I received a copy of their response to my petition. 
I don't know if you've granted them any additional time but my question is whether the 20 day 
deemed denial period will be moved back as a result of your granting additional response time. Since 
our time to file for administrative review is tied into any potential deemed denial I would ask for an 
expeditious answer. 
Please call if possible and follow up with a written communication. Thank you. 
Vety^truly yoors, 
cc: A. Au 
L>_ p. A— C i ^ S u ^ 
/ \C S ^-^ 
APPENDIX B 
Otah Court of A P P ^ 
JUL \ 6 «B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KNOWLEDGE DATA SYSTEMS, ] 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, ] 
AND AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ] 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondents/Appellees.] 
i JOINT MOTION AND STIPULATION | TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
i Case No. 930323 
i Priority 15 
On June 15, 1993, the Appellees filed their Brief in 
the above captioned appeal and argued therein that the Court 
of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Because 
the issue of jurisdiction had not previously been contested, 
several factual items relevant to this issue had not 
previously been certified as part of the appellate record. 
Pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure both the Appellant and the Appellees jointly 
stipulate and move that the Court supplement the appellate 
record in this appeal by certifying and transmitting the 
Affidavit of Alan L. Hennebold, attached hereto as Exhibit A, 
as part of the record. 
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